Introduction
Competition, being a component of the freedom of establishment -though not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland -forms one of the fundamental pillars of the concept of market economy. Paradoxically, undisturbed market competition is impossible without regulatory measures introduced by economic administration. This conclusion can be phrased as "a general obligation of the legislative authorities to issue relevant legislation aimed at creating or, potentially, protecting, the existing competition mechanisms" (Strzyczkowski 2011: 113) . Currently, legislation creating such protective measures is dispersed among many acts of To protect the system of competition, legislation must be supplemented by executive interventions, involving, among other things, the control of compliance with adopted laws. In public procurement market this control is, primarily, carried out by public procurement entities:
the President of the Public Procurement Office and the National Appeal Chamber, and furthermore
by the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection and the Court od
Competition and Consumer Protection. For these bodies, one of the common spheres of competition protection within the public procurement market is contend with bid rigging.
This article sets out to answer the question on the effectiveness of the nature and level of cooperation between heterogenic bodies -with respect to subjects involved in particular contracts -in terms of protection of the professed market values. In consequence, it is necessary to present the experiences of administrative authorities, with special emphasis on the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), related to combating prohibited cooperation on the public procurement market. Furthermore, it is necessary to attempt a description of features specific to competition, analyse case law exploring differences in assessing premises for contract termination, and to present the decisions of the President of the Office of Competition and
Consumer Protection (hereinafter also: UOKiK President) that have been repealed on appeal by 1 The author classifies PPLA as a piece of legislation that lays down supra-sectoral guarantees for fair competition. Polish law with the EU standards, including procurement directives, the major objective of which was to make tenders competitive (Kieres 2008:13) . The position of competition as an independent value stems from the basic assumption that underpin economics, pursuant to which not only does market competition cause the decrease of prices of goods and services, but also contributes to the increased innovativeness or promotion of non-price related qualities of offered goods, thereby generating benefits for the public procurement system. However, competition and correct management of public spending 2 is at risk because of certain actions by market players, including prohibited forms of cooperation. Not only national, but also supranational authorities find it necessary to combat tender collusion (European Commission 2014).
Although Polish public procurement regulations, unlike in the German system, are collected in one act, tools aimed at protecting competitions, combating collusions, are dispersed over numerous regulations 3 . At the same time, the scopes of specific regulations intermingle. As a result, competition on the Polish public procurement market is protected in a two-fold manner. Firstly, it is regulated directly by PPLA, and exercised by the internal subject: the organiser of the tender procedure, and external authorities: the President of the Public Procurement Office (hereinafter UZP President), National Appeal Tribunal (hereinafter KIO) and common courts. The second tier 2 The value of the public procurement market in 2013 amounted to PLN 143.2 bn (Report by the President of the Public Procurement Office on the functioning of the public procurement system in , Warsaw 2014 
Bid rigging on the Polish public procurement market
Substantially, cases of bid rigging may be classified into two major categories: vertical and horizontal bid rigging. For the purpose of this paper, agreements between contractors are of key importance, and they fall into the latter category. These agreements are concluded between entities functioning at the same level of business transactions -competitors operating together on the supply side of the market. Bid rigging involves participants' resignation from competing in favour of collaborating when submitting bids. In every case, bid rigging leads to at least partial determination of the content of bids or tender strategy by independent contractors, with the aim of restricting competition to the detriment of the contracting party. "Bid rigging deprives buyers and taxpayers of cash, contributes to the decrease of the level of public trust with respect to competitive practices, weakens benefits arising of the competitive nature of the market" (OECD 2009: 1).
The analysis of the President of UOKIK's decisions delineates several fundamental mechanisms used by contractors concluding a prohibited agreement, namely: a rotational mechanism of bidding, submitting courtesy bids or submitting and withdrawing bids (Różowicz 2015b: 39-43) . However, this is not an exhaustive list of prohibited forms of cooperation (Zmowy 2013 ).
Submitting and withdrawing bids as a basic model of bid rigging
The most common mechanism on the Polish market is the submission and withdrawal of bids, involving submitting courtesy bids and bid restriction. Under this mechanism, bidders agree on the content of their bids and differentiate between them so as to ensure that they rank first after being open. Once this stage is reached, the most favourable bid is withdrawn or steps are taken to ensure its elimination, aiming at ensuring that that the least favourable of the bids submitted by colluding parties is selected.
To illustrate this method of unfair collaboration, let us discuss an example. We will assume that three bidders: A, B and C submit their bids in the tender, and the first two of them are in collusion. Contractors A and B would like to get the highest price possible for their performance, but they do not know the bid that will be submitted by contractor C. By cooperating together, A and B can minimise negative consequences of the choice between the need to present the best bid 
Bid rigging and the concept of single economic unit
The CCPA and PPL regulations do not prohibit all forms of cooperation between bidders.
The President of UOKiK, following the single economic unit concept developed in the EU case law and adopted by Polish courts, cannot take measures stipulated by CCPA if the entities' operations are not independent. To conclude that there is a "single economic unit" in a procedure, there must be capital or actual relations within a capital group that deprive its subsidiaries of the actual freedom to determine their own actions on the market (Materna 2009: 130-133, 154-155) . opportunity allows them to manipulate the result of the tender to the detriment of the purchaser. It is a consequence of the fact that close mutual relationships between such enterprises facilitate a broad exchange of information on prices or other terms and conditions of their respective bids. For this purpose, the impact of the said concept has been limited in the public procurement system. "Informator Urzędu Zamówień Publicznych", an publication of the Public Procurement Office, explains that Article 24(2)(5) of PPLA is "a manifestation of legislator's intent to protect the correct course of the proceedings whenever bids or applications for participation are submitted by entrepreneurs that constitute one economic entity" (Starzyk 2013: 38) It must be emphasized that the sole fact of belonging to one capital group does not exclude a contractor ex lege from the proceedings, but results in contracting party's obligation to explain this issue. If a contractor submits a list of entities belonging to the same capital group, it is requested by the ordering party to provide explanations on the relationships referred to in Article 24(2)(5) PPLA in order to determine whether the conditions for excluding a contractor have been met (Różowicz 2014c) .
Given the different treatment of cooperation between entities within capital groups in the context of CCPA and PPLA, it is not possible to develop a uniform position in this respect.
However, there are no obstacles for players on the public procurement market to rely auxiliarily on legal literature in the field of competition protection, e.g. when assessing whether a specific organisational structure can be classified as a capital group.
Establishment of an illegal consortium
Apart from creating capital groups, business entities may also cooperate by forming consortia. However, this form of cooperation may result in the breach of the CCPA and PPLA provisions. A consortium is one of the forms of cooperation falling within the scope of an agreement referred to in Article 6 CCPA. In consequence, if the establishment of a tender consortium results in the restriction of competition, it forms a prohibited agreement restricting competition. Polish law does not include any legal definition of a consortium. In legal literature on public procurement law it has been assumed that a consortium is an entity created by way of an agreement by entities conducting business activity with the aim to submit a common bid and, once the contract has been awarded to them, its joint performance (Daszkiewicz 2015) . A consortium does not need to have any specified organisational structure or its own assets separated from the assets of its members. In literature it has been argued that a consortium agreement is treated as an enriched (atypical) civil law partnership agreement (Stecki 1997: 140-146) . According to L.
Stecki, the opinion that a consortium and a civil law partnership share a number of common qualities is supported by the fact that a consortium, just like a civil law partnership involves a specific commonness of interests and legal-economic risks of its members. Both institutions require its members to cooperate in order to achieve a specified economic goal. The assessment of the consortium's legality should be always based on the reasons for which the consortium was established. However, to determine this issue in a specific case can be very difficult. European panel of SOKIK found that the contractors had proven that they had not been able, without incurring loss, to perform the contract. Contractors argued that by acting jointly they would improve their effectiveness, while the conditions of their joint offer were more favourable to the contracting party than the conditions they could present in separate bids (cf. Article 8(1) CCPA).
As M. Sieradzka is right to emphasize, the "anticompetitive nature of a consortium [in this caseauthor's note] excludes the existence of an economic rationale for a common bid. In such a case, the exclusion of competition between contractors submitting a common bid is compensated, in a way, by the benefits for the customers of the consortium" (Sieradzka 2015) . In consequence, no agreement restricting competition took place. In this respect, the difference of opinion between the President of UOKiK and SOKiK boils down to a different interpretation of facts and does not involve a difference in the interpretation of law, and as such will not be analysed further.
However, one of the claims included in the rationale to the SOKiK judgement should be challenged. The judgement provides that: "only the agreements that are concluded by entrepreneurs participating in a tender separately should be considered banned in the meaning of the act". To If one adopted this view, an agreement resulting in the submission of one, overestimated bid by a consortium where its members would be able to submit single bids, would not be considered prohibited. Going one step further, one should conclude that it would be acceptable for two competitors on a duopolist market to form a consortium and submit one joint unfavourable bid. Even in such an extreme situation, the contracting party would be unable to reject the bids by unfair contractors. Furthermore, if no circumstances referred to in Article 93(1)(4) PPL took place, the contracting party would be obliged to award the order to such a consortium. Taking the foregoing into account, it seems that SOKiK's opinion should not be supported, while the consortium members participating in the tender should cooperate in the scope and form that would not infringe the competition protection law.
Conclusion
The existence of restrictions to competition calls for state intervention aimed at removing them and restoring undisturbed market mechanisms. The principle of competition protection guarantees the effective and healthy functioning of the mechanisms of market economy. As M.A.
Waligórski claims, the limits of intervention "result from objective premises for the organisation of the social process of management" (Waligórski 2001: 49) . The public law intervention framework applicable to the cooperation of market entities are, as it seems, compliant with the rule of proportionality and the balance between private and public interests. Legislation allows for a broad scope of cooperation possibilities, banning only the cooperation that would aim at distorting competition for the sole purpose of increasing economic profits of the business partners concerned.
However, the protection of competition requires that its guardians be equipped with relevant legal tools. The reasoning presented above has shown that both public procurement market players and the President of UOKiK and SOKiK have at their disposal mechanisms enabling them to prevent bid rigging. The specificity of the control procedures and partially different rules governing the cooperation bans prevent the full exchange of knowledge and experiences between these bodies. However, subject to the maintenance of the specificity of forms and purposes of control, these authorities should collaborate to a broader extent than so far. The President of UOKiK has noted this issue (UOKiK 2014). There is no need for the cooperation to be fully institutionalized. The soft forms of assistance seems also to be very useful.
In the author's opinion, when it comes to systemic solutions, it would be advisable to introduce a communication tool between the contracting parties and the antimonopoly authority referred to in the "Competition policy for 2014-2018", supplemented by communication tools available to KIO. To extend the competencies of the competition protection authority authorising it to issue opinions in appeal procedures before KIO and common courts would provide these bodies with specialist knowledge. However, the opinions should not be binding for the authorities settling appeals. This tool would allow for holding contractors liable both at the stage of a tender and in proceedings before the President of UOKiK. Moreover, it would possibly decrease the number of discrepancies in case law. However, considering the economics of tender proceedings and the proceedings before KIO, UOKiK would need to verify cases and issue opinions expediently. The proposed solution includes also the obligation of the contracting parties to notify UOKiK whenever they suspect bid rigging. This proposal requires a cautious approach, since to ensure full effectiveness of this solution it would be necessary to introduce liability of the contracting party or its employees for failure to perform this duty. Given the nature of the tender procedure whose fundamental aim is to purchase goods and services, and not to prevent unfair market practices, additional tasks should rather be "good practices" and should not put the contracting parties at risk of becoming liable as a result of contractors' unfair conduct. What is more, this solution seems to unnecessarily formalise operations, as despite the lack of such an obligation contracting parties often notify the President of UOKiK of suspected cases of collusion The extended scope of cooperation would facilitate the efforts to prevent bid rigging without any need to depart from the dualist system of competition protection which currently is inter-complementary and creates a transparent and coherent model. Double control measures resulting from an exceedingly broad scope of duties imposed on the public procurement sector with
